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Abstract
This paper analyzes whether equity holdings of international lenders a¤ect the transmission of
credit supply shocks from developed countries to emerging markets. I exploit the 1998 Russian
debt default as an exogenous credit supply shock to international lenders and trace out the impact
on bank lending in Peru. I nd that after the shock international lenders with equity holdings in
Peruvian banks increased nancing to banks in Peru, while international lenders without equity
holdings reduced nancing to banks in Peru. This e¤ect could be driven either by di¤erential credit
supply from international lenders or by heterogeneity in credit demand across banks. I control for
credit demand by examining rms that have loans from both banks with international equity holders
and banks without international equity holders and nd evidence for the credit supply explanation.
The change in credit supply has real e¤ects: I nd a lower bankruptcy rate among rms borrowing
from banks with international equity holders than among rms borrowing from banks without
international equity holders. These results suggest that equity holdings of international lenders
mitigate the transmission of credit supply shocks to emerging markets.
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I Introduction
The increasing globalization of nancial and banking markets provides important advantages in terms
of diversication and e¢ ciency gains. However, the globalization of nancial markets also creates
possible channels for the transmission of nancial shocks across markets. An important question in
nance is whether or not nancial institutions transmit nancial shocks across markets and whether
or not such shocks impact real economic activity. On the one hand, e¢ cient market theory suggests
that, as long as investment opportunities are constant, shocks to nancial institutions in one market
have no e¤ect on lending in other markets. On the other hand, if nancing frictions prevent nancial
institutions from accessing alternative nancing sources to cover shortfalls as a result of a shock, one
market may a¤ect lending in other markets.1
In this paper I investigate the transmission of a foreign nancial shock to banks in an emerging
market as one example of whether nancial institutions transmit nancial shocks across markets. I
develop a simple model that suggests that international lenders with equity holdings in emerging
market banks are less likely to transmit shocks than international lenders without equity holdings.
The intuition is simple: a lender that is also an owner of an emerging market bank can directly
monitor the banks lending decisions. As a result, banks are not tempted to increase the risk of their
loan portfolios in response to a shock. In contrast, a lender without an equity stake cannot prevent an
emerging market bank from increasing the risk of its loan portfolio after a shock. The optimal response
of lenders without equity stakes is therefore to reduce lending to banks in emerging markets.2
I analyze the transmission of nancial shocks empirically by examining the e¤ect of the negative
credit supply shock resulting from the 1998 Russian debt default on bank lending in Peru. I focus on a
single country as it allows me to control for country-wide shocks to investment opportunities by using
cross-sectional variation in the response of international lenders to credit supply shocks.3 I focus on
Peru because at the time of the Russian default there were no direct trade or nancial links between
Russia and Peru and the main impact of the Russian default on Peru was arguably via international
lenders. Moreover, I use a unique dataset that covers all corporate loans in Peru to control directly for
changes in rm investment opportunities (lending opportunities) and to trace out the impact on real
1The nancial frictions view requires a violation of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for banks.
2Put di¤erently, lenders without equity stakes cannot prevent asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
3Examples of country-wide shocks that a¤ect investment opportunities are common price shocks or general updating of
investor beliefs about investment opportunties in a market. See Summers (2000) for a discussion of potential mechanisms.
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economic activity.
The following example illustrates the channel under investigation. Citibank and UBS are both
international lenders that provide nancing to banks in Peru. I distinguish between international
lenders with equity holdings (owner/lenders) and international lenders without equity holdings (arms-
length lenders). Citibank has a Peruvian subsidiary (Citi-Peru) and is therefore an owner/lender, while
UBS has no equity holdings in Peru and is therefore an arms-length lender. As a result, there are
two types of Peruvian banks: foreign-owned banks (e.g. Citi-Peru) that have international lenders as
equity holders and domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese) that have no international lenders
as equity holders. I ask the following question: Do credit supply shocks to arms-length lenders (e.g.
UBS ) have the same impact on nancing to banks in Peru as credit supply shocks to owner/lenders
(e.g. Citibank)?
I rst examine the impact of the Russian default on international lenders. I nd that after the
Russian default both arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) and owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank) experience a
large decline in share prices. I nd no di¤erence in the impact across the two types of lenders which I
interpret as evidence that the Russian default represents a negative credit supply shock to both types
of lenders. I then analyze the impact of the credit supply shock on nancing to banks in Peru. I nd
that owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank) increase nancing to their subsidiaries in Peru (e.g. Citi-Peru),
while arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) decrease nancing to banks in Peru (e.g. Banco Wiese). As a
result, nancing to foreign-owned banks (e.g. Citi-Peru) increases, whereas nancing to domestically-
owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese) decreases. I interpret these ndings as evidence that equity holdings
of international lenders mitigate the transmission of credit supply shocks.
I then trace out the impact of the credit supply shock on real rm outcomes. The credit supply
shock a¤ects real outcomes under two conditions. The rst condition is that banks cannot o¤set the
shock through accessing other sources of nancing. The second condition is that rms cannot o¤set
the shock by switching across banks or borrowing from other nancial intermediaries. In other words,
the transmission of nancial shocks to the real economy requires nancial frictions at both the bank
and the rm level.4
To evaluate the rst condition, I estimate the impact of the credit supply shock on lending by
4The literature on the bank lending channel emphasizes these conditions as prerequisites for the transmission of
nancial shocks to the real economy (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988)).
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foreign- and domestically-owned banks. This estimation poses an identication problem because after
the Russian default rms borrowing from foreign-owned banks may experience di¤erent shocks to
investment opportunities than rms borrowing from domestically-owned banks. For example, suppose
that all exporters borrow from foreign-owned banks (e.g. Citi-Peru) and all non-exporters borrow
from domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese). If the Russian default increases export demand,
for example via its e¤ect on exchange rates, exporters may have better investment opportunities and
higher credit demand which would bias the estimation of the credit supply shock.
I therefore develop an empirical estimator to control for changes in investment opportunities. I
exploit the fact that many rms have loans with both foreign- and domestically-owned banks and com-
pare the change in borrowing across loan relationships within rms (e.g. for the same rm comparing
borrowing from Citi-Peru versus borrowing from Banco Wiese). Using within-rm variation allows
me to control for changes in investment opportunities and I can therefore identify the impact of the
credit supply shock on bank lending.
I nd that lending by foreign-owned banks increases by 15.6 percent compared to lending by
domestically-owned banks after controlling for investment opportunities. I nd a similar e¤ect of 16.2
percent when I estimate the e¤ect without controlling for investment opportunities. These ndings
suggest that banks cannot o¤set the credit supply shock and the shock therefore a¤ects bank lending.
To ensure robustness, I also estimate the impact of the credit supply shock using variation in nancing
by international lenders instead of bank ownership and nd qualitatively and quantitatively similar
results. I also examine trends prior to the Russian default and rule out that the results are driven by
di¤erential pre-trends across foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
To analyze whether rms can o¤set the shoc·k, I examine how established bank relationships with
foreign- and domestically-owned banks a¤ect rm outcomes after the Russian default. For each rm
I compute the share of lending with foreign-owned banks prior to the Russian default. I nd that a
one standard deviation increase in the share of lending with foreign-owned banks increases borrowing
by 9.3 percent and raises the likelihood of rm survival by 2.3 percentage points after the Russian
default. This result shows that rms cannot o¤set the credit supply shock by switching across banks
or borrowing elsewhere.
In short, the ndings in this paper suggest that nancial institutions transmit nancial shocks
across markets and that nancial shocks a¤ect real economic activity. Specically, I show that arms-
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length lenders (e.g. UBS ) are more likely to transmit credit supply shocks than owner/lenders (e.g.
Citibank). The di¤erential transmission reduces bank lending by domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco
Wiese) compared to foreign-owned banks (e.g. Citi-Peru). As a result, rms banking with foreign-
owned banks have better access to bank lending after a credit supply shock than rms banking with
domestically-owned banks, which a¤ects real rm outcomes such as rm survival.
This paper relates to a large literature on the transmission of nancial shocks across countries.
Theoretical work by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Calvo (1998) emphasizes the importance of common
leveraged creditors and lack of liquidity in the transmission of nancial shocks. Empirical work focuses
on distinguishing the di¤erent channels of transmission such as trade or nancial linkages. On trade
linkages, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), Forbes (2002), and Forbes (2004) nd evidence
of the transmission of shocks via trade channels. On nancial linkages, empirical work examining
international investors (Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000)) or country-specic shocks (Peek and Rosengreen (2000a)) nds
evidence that foreign investors spread crises across markets. The empirical approach in this paper
di¤ers in that I use cross-sectional variation in the way that nancial institutions respond to shocks
within one country and control directly for changes in investment opportunities using loan-level data.
The estimation of real rm outcomes connects to a large literature on the impact of nancial
shocks to banks on the real economy. Theoretical work by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Stein (1998) shows that nancial shocks a¤ect real
rm outcomes only if there are credit market imperfections both at the bank and rm level. The early
empirical literature by Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) uses correlations between
aggregate changes in liquidity and aggregate changes in output to show that nancial shocks a¤ect
real outcomes. However, aggregate correlations may be driven by omitted variables that a¤ect both
bank credit supply and rm investment opportunities. Recent work by Kayshap, Lamont and Stein
(1994), Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ashcraft (2006) uses variation across banks and rms or natural
experiments (Peek and Rosengren (2000a), Ashcraft (2005), Khwaja and Mian (2007), Paravisini
(2007)) to control for omitted variables. This paper is di¤erent in that I develop an empirical estimator
using loan-level data to determine whether changes in credit supply are correlated with changes in
investment opportunities.5
5Khwaja and Mian (2007) use a similar empirical approach to identify the bank lending channel. However, their paper
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The paper also relates to a literature on di¤erences between foreign- and domestically-owned banks
in emerging markets. Empirical work using cross-sectional data on lending (Berger, Klapper and Udell
(2001), Mian (2006)) or panel data on foreign bank entry (Gormley (2007)) nds that foreign-owned
banks tend to nance larger rms, whereas domestically-owned banks tend to nance smaller, infor-
mationally opaque rms. Regarding nancial shocks, Arena, Reinhart, and Vazquez (2006) nd little
di¤erence in the lending channel of foreign- and domestically-owned banks using panel data on emerg-
ing market banks and Goldberg (2002) nds mixed results on the responsiveness of foreign subsidiaries
of American banks to macroeconomic conditions in the United States. However, using bank-level
data for Latin American and Asian countries, several authors (Diamond and Rajan (2001), Peek and
Rosengreen (2000b), Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001), Detragiache and Gupta (2004)) nd that
foreign-owned banks increase lending as compared to domestically-owned banks after nancial crises.
This paper is di¤erent in that I exploit a natural experiment to identify the impact of an exogenous -
nancial shock and use loan-level data to control for di¤erences between foreign- and domestically-owned
banks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the institutional background and summarizes
the main non-parametric results. Section III provides a simple model of international lenders and
their response to a credit supply shock. Section IV outlines the identication problem of estimating
the impact of the credit supply shock and proposes an empirical strategy to solve the identication
problem. Section V summarizes the data. Section VI estimates the e¤ect of the credit supply on bank
lending. Section VII estimates the impact of the credit supply shock on rm outcomes. Section VIII
concludes.
II Background and non-parametric results
A Background
In 1992, Russia implemented far-reaching economic reforms to replace an order based on state own-
ership and central planning with a private market economy and voluntary exchange. The reforms led
to a large increase in private-sector employment and the formation of capital markets but also created
macroeconomic instabilities. In 1995, after several unsuccessful attempts, Russia implemented an eco-
focuses on a domestic shock to bank deposits rather than the transmission of nancial shocks by nancial institutions.
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nomic reform program to stabilize the economy and restore scal discipline. The reform successfully
reduced ination, but over the following two years, an uncontrolled decline in federal tax revenues
sharply increased Russias debt burden. Starting in July 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis prompted
concerns about emerging market investments and eventually international lenders started to withdraw
international funds from Russia. In August 1998, the decline in international funds triggered a massive
default on government debt. As a result, many Russian banks went bankrupt, the domestic payment
system collapsed, and the Russian currency went into a free fall.6
The default was unexpected for many international lenders because Russia had cooperated closely
with the International Monetary Fund on its stabilization plan. Hence, many international lenders
su¤ered major losses from both the debt default and the devaluation of the Russian currency and some
international lenders went bankrupt as a consequence. The bankruptcies and general uncertainty in
interbank lending markets increased bank liquidity needs, which in turn triggered a rise in interest
rates. Moreover, widely used value-at-risk models prompted international lenders to liquidate risky
investments, which included reductions in nancing of emerging market banks. Since all international
lenders were liquidating investments at the same time, the sell-o¤s further increased interest rates and
prompted more sell-o¤s. Some observers also argue that the Russian default directly raised investor
expectations of the likelihood of default in other emerging markets, which further raised interest rates
on emerging market investments.7
For the empirical analysis in this paper, it is not necessary to separate out the di¤erent mechanisms
that prompted the rise in interest rates. Instead I interpret the aggregate e¤ect of the Russian default
on international lenders as a credit supply shock, which raised the cost of capital to international
lenders and therefore raised the interest rate charged to banks in emerging markets.
In the case of Peru, the impact of the Russian default operated primarily via international lenders.
At the time of the Russian default, there were no direct nancial or trade links between Russia and
Peru. Also, Peru had been una¤ected by the preceding Asian Financial Crisis and had been growing
at an annual rate of 4 percent during the three years prior to the Russian default. However, Perus
nancial system was exposed to the credit supply shock because Peruvian banks were borrowing heavily
from international lenders. In total, international lenders provided $3bn in nancing, equivalent to 23
6For a more detailed account of the Russian default see Shleifer and Treisman (2000).
7For a discussion of potential mechanisms see Summers (2000).
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percent of total bank credit. Most nancing by international lenders was bank-to-bank loans with a
maturity of less than one year.8
To illustrate lending between international lenders and Peruvian banks, I list the three largest
international lenders for each of the twenty largest Peruvian banks in Table 1. On the lender side,
there are both arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) and owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank). On the borrower
side, there are foreign-owned banks (e.g. Citi-Peru) and domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese).
As shown in the table, the main international lender of foreign-owned banks is almost always the
owner/lender. For example, the largest international lender to Citi-Peru, the Peruvian subsidiary of
Citibank, is Citibank. Similarly, the main international lender to Banco Continental, which is a joint
venture between the Spanish bank BBVA and a Peruvian business group, is BBVA.
For comparison, consider Perus largest domestically-owned bank Banco de Credito. The three
largest international lenders to Banco de Credito are Barclays, UBS and ING Bank, none of which
owns an equity stake in Banco de Credito. Similarly, Perus second largest bank, Banco Wiese, borrows
from international lenders Citibank, Rabobank and Standard Chartered, none of which owns an equity
stake in Banco Wiese.
The table also shows that both foreign- and domestically-owned banks receive signicant nancing
from international lenders. Moreover, many international lenders provide nancing to more than one
Peruvian bank. For example, owner/lender Cititbank provides nancing to both its subsidiary Citi-Peru
and domestically-owned Banco Wiese. Similarly, arms-length lender Barclays provides arms-length
nancing to both foreign-owned Banco Continental and domestically-owned Banco de Credito. I use
these cross-linkages for identication in the empirical analysis.
B Non-Parametric Results
This section analyzes the impact of the credit supply shock using aggregate data. The analysis proceeds
in three steps. First, I document the impact of the Russian default on international lenders and analyze
the di¤erential response by arms-length lenders and owner/lenders. Second, I estimate the impact on
lending by foreign-owned banks and domestically-owned banks. Third, I trace out the impact on rms
borrowing from foreign-owned banks versus rms borrowing from domestically-owned banks.
8For a detailed account of the impact of the Russian default on Peru see Superintendency of Banking, Insurance and
Pension Funds (2006).
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Figure I plots the relative change in share prices of arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) and owner/lenders
(e.g. Citibank) one year before and after the Russian default.9 I interpret the change in the share price
as a measure of the magnitude of the credit supply shock to international lenders. The gure shows
that share prices of both owner/lenders and arms-length lenders su¤ered a decline of 50 percent in
the months after the Russian default. Importantly, there is no di¤erence in the impact of the credit
supply shock between arms-length lenders and owner/lenders. I interpret this gure as evidence that
the Russian default was a negative credit supply shock to all international lenders.
On the international lender side, I use micro-data on bank-to-bank loans to analyze the impact of
the credit supply shock on banks in Peru. I aggregate bank nancing by owner/lenders to subsidiaries
(e.g. Citibank lending to Citi-Peru) and bank nancing by arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS lending
to Banco Wiese). Figure IIa plots the two time-series for the period three months before and one
year after the Russian default. I do not plot earlier data because the bank regulator only started
collecting bank-to-bank lending data four months prior to the Russian default. The gure shows that
arms-length nancing is signicantly larger than owner/lender nancing. This di¤erence in levels
reects the fact that domestically-owned banks have a larger market share than foreign-owned banks
and foreign-owned banks also take out some arms-length debt.
To assess relative changes, Figure IIb plots the natural logarithm of the two time-series. I normalize
the time-series to zero at the time of the Russian default such that the y-axis represents the relative
change in nancing compared to the date of the Russian default. The gure shows that nancing
by owner/lenders increased by 30 percent in the months after the Russian default. In comparison,
nancing by arms-length lenders decreases by 30 percent within one year after the Russian default. I
interpret this gure as evidence of the di¤erential response to the credit supply shock by arms-length
lenders and owner/lenders.
On the borrower side, I aggregate total bank-to-bank loans by foreign- and domestically-owned
banks. The total by borrower can be di¤erent from the total by lender because foreign-owned bank also
take out arms-length nancing. Figure IIIa and Figure IIIb plot the time-series of total international
bank nancing to foreign- and domestically-owned banks in logs and levels, respectively. Figure IIIa
shows that nancing to domestically-owned banks is larger than nancing to foreign-owned banks
9 I use data on all owner/lenders and the twenty largest arms-length lenders for which share prices are available. In
total, the gures uses share prices for 27 international lenders. The share prices were obtained from Bloomberg.
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which reects the di¤erence in market shares. Figure IIIb shows that nancing to domestically-owned
banks declines by 29 percent, while nancing to foreign-owned banks only declines by 3 percent. The
di¤erential response by arms-length lenders and owner/lenders thus translates into lower nancing to
domestically- versus foreign-owned banks.
I then use microdata on all corporate loans to trace out the e¤ect on bank lending. I aggregate
total lending for foreign- and domestically-owned banks. Figure IVa and Figure IVb plot the two time
series in logs and levels, respectively. Again, Figure IVa shows a di¤erence in levels, which reects
the di¤erence in market shares of domestically- and foreign-owned banks. Figure IVb shows that after
the Russian default bank lending by foreign-owned banks declined by 7 percent, but bank lending by
domestically-owned banks declined by 21 percent. Hence, di¤erential nancing by arms-length lenders
and owner/lenders translates into di¤erential lending by foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Importantly, the gure also reveals a pre-trend across foreign-owned versus domestically-owned
banks. This pre-trend is driven by foreign banks that had entered the Peruvian markets after nan-
cial liberalization in the early 1990s and were expanding their activities. However, the pre-trend is
small compared to the di¤erential e¤ect after the Russian default and therefore cannot explain the
observed di¤erence between foreign- and domestically-owned banks. Assuming the pre-trend would
have continued at a similar rate after the Russian default, the trend would account for 18 percent of
the observed di¤erence between foreign-owned and domestically-owned banks. I address the pre-trend
in more detail in the empirical section.
I then divide rms in two groups: rms for which the main bank before the Russian default is a
foreign-owned bank and rms for which the main bank before the Russian default is a domestically-
owned bank. I aggregate total borrowing for the two groups. Figure Va and Figure Vb plot the
time-series in levels and logs, respectively. The gures show that rms banking with domestically-
owned banks decrease borrowing by 20 percent, while rms banking with foreign-owned banks decrease
borrowing by 5 percent. These gures suggest that rms cannot o¤set the credit supply shock by
switching across banks or borrowing elsewhere.
In short, I nd that after the Russian default owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank) increase nancing to
subsidiaries (e.g. Citi-Peru), while arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) decrease nancing to all banks
(e.g. Banco Wiese). Second, as a result lending by foreign-owned (e.g. Citi-Peru) banks remains
stable, while lending by domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese) declines. Third, rms banking
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with foreign-owned banks have better access to bank lending after the Russian default than rms
banking with domestically-owned banks.
III A simple model of international lenders
This section provides a simple model of international lending. The model formalizes the di¤erential
response of arms-length lenders and owner/lenders to a credit supply shock. I also discuss possible
extensions and alternative explanations for a di¤erential e¤ect between the two types of lenders.
Assume banks in emerging markets nance domestic investment projects. All investment projects
are of the same size, which is normalized to one. There are two types of projects: safe and risky. If
a bank invests in a safe project, the project yields S > 1. If the bank invests in a risky project, the
project yields R > S with probability p and zero with probability (1  p): Risky projects have a lower
expected net present value than safe projects such that pR < S.
Bank renance their lending by borrowing from international lenders. There are two types of
international lenders: arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) and owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank). As a
result, there are two types of banks in emerging markets: foreign-owned banks (e.g. Citi-Peru) and
domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese). Banks are operated by bank managers, who maximize
the bank value for equity holders.
Suppose a domestically-owned bank (e.g. Banco Wiese) borrows one unit of capital from an arms-
length lender (e.g. UBS ) and promises to repay D. If the bank manager invests in safe projects, the
payo¤ is (S D). If the manager invests in risky projects, the expected payo¤ is p(R D): The manager
maximizes the bank equity value and therefore invests in safe projects if and only if D  S pR(1 p) . Let
D = (1 + r) such that r denotes the net interest rate on arms-length lending. This yields the rst
proposition.
Proposition 1 Banks nanced by arms-length debt can sustain safe projects if and only if
(1 + r)  S   pR
(1  p) : (1)
This proposition states that arms-length lenders cannot sustain safe projects once interest rates
become too high.
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For comparison, suppose a foreign-owned bank (e.g. Citi-Peru) borrows one unit of capital from
its owner/lender (e.g. Citibank). If the manager invests in safe projects, the payo¤ is (S  D). If the
manager invests in risky projects, the expected payo¤ is (pR  D): Since pR < S the manager never
invests in risky projects. I summarize this result as the second proposition.
Proposition 2 Banks nanced by owner/lenders can sustain safe projects if and only if
(1 + r)  S: (2)
The di¤erence between owner/lenders and arms-length lenders is that the manager of an owner/lender
internalizes the cost of default (1 p)D; whereas the manager of an arms-length lender does not. There-
fore owner/lender continue nancing safe projects at higher interest rates, even if arms-length lending
breaks down at those higher rates. Moreover, note that safe projects are only nanced by both types
of lenders if the rate of return S is higher than the gross interest rate (1 + r).
A simple example illustrates this model. Assume safe return S = 1:2; risky return R = 1:3; and the
probability of default p = 12 : If r = 8%, then (S D) = 0:12 and p(R D) = 0:11, such that safe projects
can be nanced both by arms-length lenders or owner/lenders. If r = 12%; then (S  D) = 0:08 and
p(R D) = 0:09; such that arms-length lending breaks down because managers choose risky projects.
However, safe projects are still nanced by owner/lenders because they yield a positive net present
value. In fact, safe projects are nanced by owner/lenders if and only if r  20%:
The example makes clear that there are three regions of interest for interest rate r. I summarize
this result as the third proposition.
Proposition 3 If (1 + r)  S pR(1 p) (low region), safe projects can be nanced both by arms-length
lenders and owner/lenders. If S pR(1 p) < (1 + r)  S (middle region); safe projects can be nanced only
by owner/lenders. If S < (1 + r) (high region) no safe projects can be nanced.
This proposition shows that there exists a set of parameter values for interest rate r; such that
arms-length lenders forego protable investment opportunities.
I now consider the impact of a credit supply shock to international investors. I dene a credit
supply shock as the change in the lenders cost of capital r: Consider the perspective of a domestically-
owned bank (e.g. Banco Wiese) with lending nanced by arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ). To focus
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on the most interesting case, consider a credit supply shock that raises the arms-length lenders cost
of capital r from the low to the middle region. As a result, arms-length lenders cut nancing and
lending by domestically-owned banks drops to zero. For comparison, consider a foreign-owned bank
(e.g. Citi-Peru) with lending nanced by owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank). If a credit supply shock raises
the owner/lenders cost of capital r from the the low to middle region, the owner/lender continues to
provide nancing. I summarize this result as the fourth proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider an increase in the opportunity cost of capital r from the low region to the
middle region. As a result,
(i) arms-length investors reduce nancing but owner/lenders continue nancing, and
(ii) lending by domestically-owned banks decreases compared to lending by foreign-owned banks.
The rst result follows directly from the third proposition. The second result follows from the
assumption that domestically-owned banks borrow from arms-length lenders and foreign-owned banks
borrow from owner/lenders.
This simple model can be extended in several ways. First, the model assumes that managers act
in the interest of equity holders. If there is an agency problem between equity holders and man-
agers, for example if managers can earn private benets from taking on risky projects, owner/lenders
need to monitor managers directly to limit the scope for the managers self-interest. For example,
owner/lenders might review investment projects to prevent risky lending. In this case, the observed
results are at least partly due to better corporate governance in foreign-owned banks. I view this
explanation as complementary because in this version of the model owner/lenders institute better cor-
porate governance because they internalize the impact of debt default. Better corporate governance
in foreign-owned banks is thus a complementary mechanism that results from the same underlying
di¤erence between owner/lenders and arms-length lenders as in the model outlined above.
Second, the model can be extended to endogenize the choice of international lenders to invest
at arms-length or as owner/lenders. This is important for the empirical analysis if the characteris-
tics that prompt international lenders to enter as owner/lenders directly a¤ect lending after a credit
supply shock. For example, suppose that owner/lenders enter because they are better at managing
subsidiaries than arms-length lenders and better managements skills yield a comparative advantage in
maintaining safe projects after a credit supply shock. Under this assumption, the di¤erential response
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of owner/lenders versus arms-length lenders is at least party driven by management skills. Again, I
view this explanation as a complementary mechanism because it directly assumes that owner/lenders
are better at maintaining a safe project mix, which is the main di¤erence between arms-length lenders
and owner/lenders. I leave it to future research to distinguish between these alternative mechanisms.
More generally, an entry model would also shed light on the question of the socially e¢ cient bank
ownership structure. The model in this paper suggests that foreign ownership is more e¢ cient than
domestic ownership because under domestic ownership banks sometimes forego protable investment
opportunities. However, the model could be extended to allow for other benets of domestically-owned
banks such as better monitoring or screening abilities.10 In this case, the entry model may yield an
e¢ cient ownership structure with both foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Finally, the model suggests that banks may engage in risk-taking at the cost of lower expected
prots. More generally, banks may also engage in other activities that benet bank owners at the
expense of arms-length lenders. For example, banks may engage in tunneling, related lending or
looting.11 Instead of modeling such activities explicitly, I interpret risk-taking as a proxy for such
activities.
IV Identication Strategy
This section outlines the strategy to identify the impact of the credit supply shock empirically. The
identication strategy proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the impact of the credit supply shock on
bank nancing by international lenders. Second, I outline the identication problem in distinguishing
between credit supply and credit demand and develop an estimator using loan-level data to control for
credit demand. Third, I discuss how to estimate the impact of the credit supply shock on rms.
A E¤ect of Foreign Ownership on Bank Financing
The rst step of the analysis is to examine the impact of international lenders on bank nancing to
foreign- and domestically-owned banks. The model predicts that after a credit supply shock arms-
10For example, Mian (2006) nds evidence that domestically-owned banks are better at relationship lending that
foreign-owned banks.
11Akerlof and Romer (1996) discuss bank owner incentives for looting as banks enter nancial distress. La Porta et al
(2003) provide empirical evidence on lending to rms owned by bank shareholders during the Mexican nancial in the
mid-90s.
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length lenders decrease nancing to all banks, while owner/lenders increase nancing to their sub-
sidiaries.
To test this prediction empirically, I estimate the OLS-regression
Dbt = b + t + 1FbAftert + "bt (3)
where Dbt denotes debt nancing by international lenders to bank b at time t: The dummy variable
Aftert denotes months after the Russian default, b and t are bank and time xed-e¤ects, and
foreign ownership Fb denotes the ownership share of international lenders. The coe¢ cient 1 captures
the di¤erential transmission of the credit supply shock to foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
The identifying assumption is that nancing of international lenders to foreign- and domestically-
owned banks would not have changed di¤erentially in the absence of the Russian default. In the
empirical section I examine pre-trends of nancing by international lenders to provide evidence on this
assumption. I also estimate the impact of the Russian default on bank nancing via deposits to ensure
that the results are not driven by variation in other nancing sources.
Moreover, the model suggests that after a credit supply shock, owner/lenders increase nancing
to its subsidiaries, but decrease nancing to non-subsidiaries. To test this prediction, I exploit cross-
linkages between international lenders and banks and analyze nancing of owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank)
to its subsidiaries (e.g. Citi-Peru) versus nancing of owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank) to non-subsidiaries
(e.g. Banco Wiese).
B Credit Supply versus Credit Demand: The Identication Problem
The second step of the analysis is to estimate the impact of the di¤erential transmission of the credit
supply shock across foreign- and domestically-owned banks. This estimation poses an identication
problem because we need to distinguish between the impact of the credit supply shock to nancing by
international lenders and changes in investment opportunities of borrowers.
The following example illustrates the identication problem. Suppose that all exporters borrow
from foreign-owned banks and all non-exporters borrow from domestically-owned banks. If the Russian
default improves export opportunities, for example via its e¤ect on the exchange rate, borrowers of
foreign-owned banks may demand more credit than borrowers from domestically-owned banks. As
15
a result, observed di¤erences in lending by foreign- versus domestically-owned banks may reect the
composite e¤ect of both credit supply and credit demand shocks. More generally, any variation across
borrowers of foreign- versus domestically-owned banks that directly a¤ects credit demand after the
shock may bias the estimation of the credit supply shock.
I modify the model from the previous section to illustrate this identication more formally. The
main purpose of the modied model is to highlight the identication problem and develop an empirical
estimator to distinguish between credit supply and credit demand. Assume the model lasts for two
periods. For simplicity, assume that banks only nance a single rm but rms can lend from several
banks. Bank b provides a loan of size Ltbj to rm j, where superscript t denotes the period.
On the credit supply side, assume banks are nanced with debt from international lenders F tb and
other forms of nancing Ktb (e.g. equity, deposits, bonds). Total bank assets L
t
b are equal to total bank
liabilities Ktb+F
t
b . I assume international investors provide funding at a constant rate and other forms
of nancing have a convex cost function  (K
t
b)
2
2 : The marginal cost of bank nancing is therefore K
t
b:
The cost parameter  denotes the slope of the marginal cost curve.
On the credit demand side, I assume rm j earns return jLtbi   
(Ltbj)
2
2 on each loan.
12 The rm
quality parameter j allows for variation in loan returns across rms. The marginal loan return is
given by j   Ltjb.
I solve for the rst period equilibrium by setting the marginal cost of nancing K1b equal to
marginal loan return j L1jb: This yields the equilibrium loan amount L1jb =
j+F
1
b
(+) . The equilibrium
loan amount is increasing in rm quality j and decreasing in the nancing cost parameter .
At the end of the rst period, the economy experiences two shocks. First, there are bank-specic
credit supply shocks Sb to nancing by international lenders such that F 2b = F
1
b + Sb. Second, there
are rm-specic credit demand shocks Dj to marginal loan returns such that marginal loan returns in
the second period are j   L2jb +Dj .
Solving for the second-period equilibrium, the equilibrium loan amount is L2jb =
j+(F
1
b +Sb)+Dj
(+) .
12A more general model would endogenize the allocation of loans across banks. This simplied formulation takes the
allocation of loans across banks as exogenous and assumes decreasing marginal returns for each loan. This formulation
can be justied by assuming that aggregate loan demand of rm j has decreasing marginal returns and rm j splits loan
demand in xed proportions across banks.
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The change in loan amount from rst to second period Ljb = L2jb   L1jb is given by
Ljb =
1
( + )
Dj +

( + )
Sb: (4)
The change in loan amount Ljb consists of two terms. The rst term on the right-hand side
1
(+)Dj denotes the impact of the rm-specic credit demand shocks on loan amount Ljb. The second
term on the right-hand side (+)Sb denotes the impact of the bank-specic credit supply shock on
loan amount Ljb.
Now suppose we use foreign bank ownership Fb as a proxy for credit supply shocks Sb and run the
OLS-regression
Ljb = 0 + 1Fb + "ib (5)
where "ib = j+ jb: The error term "jb in the OLS regression consists of a rm-specic component
j and a rm-bank specic component jb: The model suggests that Cov(j ; Fb) 6= 0 if the credit
demand shock Dj are correlated with foreign bank ownership. In this case, the foreign ownership
coe¢ cient Fb is biased.
It is di¢ cult to sign this bias because the sign depends on the distribution of credit demand
shock Dj across foreign- and domestically-owned banks. Consider the example in which all exporters
borrow from foreign-owned banks and all non-exporters borrow from domestically-owned banks. If the
credit supply shock improves export opportunities (e.g. via a reduction in the exchange rate), then
Cov(j ; Fb) > 0 and the estimated coe¢ cient 1 is biased upwards. If the credit supply shock weakens
export opportunities (e.g. because other countries devalue and export more), then Cov(j ; Fb) < 0
and the estimated coe¢ cient is biased downwards. More generally, variation in borrower composition
across foreign- and domestically-owned banks that directly a¤ects credit demand after the shock biases
the foreign ownership coe¢ cient 1: This problem is the standard identication problem of separating
out credit supply and credit demand.
C Testing Credit Supply versus Credit Demand
To address the identication problem, I propose a simple estimator. I exploit the fact that many rms
borrow from both foreign- and domestically-owned banks. Denote a foreign-owned bank with subscript
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F and and a domestically-owned bank with subscript D. Consider a rm j that has one loan with
each type of bank and compute the di¤erence in changes in loan amounts:
LjF  LjD = 
( + )
(SF   SD): (6)
Note that the rm-specic credit demand shock cancels out and the di¤erence between foreign- and
domestically-owned banks captures the impact of bank-specic credit supply shocks. Using variation
within rms across loan relationships allows me to control for rm-specic credit demand shock and I
can therefore identify the impact of the credit supply shock.
Now consider running an OLS-regression that includes rm-xed e¤ects j such that
Ljb = 0 + j + 1Fb + "ib: (7)
The rm-xed e¤ects j absorb the rm-specic credit demand shocks and foreign ownership
coe¢ cient 1 identies the impact of the credit supply shock across foreign- and domestically-owned
banks.
The identifying assumption is that Cov(Fb; "ib) = 0: This assumption holds if the rm-loan specic
shocks "ib are uncorrelated with foreign bank ownership Fb. I address the validity of this assumption
in the empirical estimation.
D Estimating the Impact of Credit Supply on Firms
The impact of the credit supply shock on rms depends on whether rms can o¤set the shock by
switching across banks. If credit markets work perfectly, we expect rms with the highest rate of
return to switch from domestically- to foreign-owned banks, leading to an e¢ cient reallocation of bank
credit across rms. However, if there are information asymmetries in credit markets, rms may not
be able to o¤set the credit supply shock by switching across banks. In this case, rms banking with
foreign-owned banks have better access to bank credit than rms banking with domestically-owned
banks. Moreover, if rms cannot borrow elsewhere, the di¤erential access to bank credit a¤ects rm
real outcomes such as loan default rates and rm survival.
To address this question, I analyze outcomes at the rm-level. For each rm j, I construct the loan-
weighted share of lending with foreign-owned banks Fj prior to the Russian default. For example, if a
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rm only borrows from foreign-owned banks, Fj is zero and if a rm only borrows from domestically-
owned banks, Fj is one. This variable captures whether a rm had established bank relationships with
foreign- or domestically-owned banks prior to the Russian default.
Let Yj be the outcome of interest such as total borrowing or loan default and denote the change
before and after the Russian default as Yj : Consider running the OLS regression
Yj = 0 + 1Fj + "j : (8)
where "j denotes the error term. The coe¢ cient on foreign ownership share 1 identies the impact
of pre-existing bank relationships with foreign- versus domestically-owned banks.
The identifying assumption is that the error term "j is uncorrelated with the share of lending from
foreign-owned banks Fj . The concerns about this identifying assumption are similar to the ones about
identifying credit supply versus credit demand. In the empirical section, I use the results from the
loan-level regressions to assess the validity of this assumption.
V Data
The empirical analysis in this paper uses loan data, rm data, and bank data from Peru. The loan
data come from the public credit registry. The rm data are from o¢ cial tax records. The bank
data are from regulatory lings and bank nancial statements. The loan and bank data were obtained
directly from the Peruvian bank regulator Superintendency of Banking, Insurance and Pension Funds
(SBS). The o¢ cial tax records were obtained via an automated internet query from the website of the
Peruvian tax administrator Superintendency of Tax Administration (SUNAT).
The bank data contain nancial statements for all 25 commercial banks and 21 municipal banks
for the years 1996 to 2000.13 All commercial banks are privately-owned with the exception of one
small government bank. Municipal banks are owned by local municipalities or individuals. I dene
foreign-owned banks as nancial institutions in which the largest shareholder is based outside Peru.
If a bank is owned jointly by domestic residents and a shareholder outside Peru, the bank is dened
13The credit registry also contains lending data on three nance companies and two micronance organizations. I drop
these institutions because nance companies primarily provide consumer loans and micronance organizations primarily
provide microloans in underserved areas. The aggregate market share in corporate lending of these institutions is less
than one percent.
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as 50 percent foreign-owned. If a bank is wholly owned by domestic residents, the bank is dened
as domestically-owned. All foreign shareholders are international lenders based in North American,
European, or other Latin American countries. Appendix I provides a list of all international lenders
with equity stakes in Peruvian banks.
The loan level data contains all corporate loans in the years 1996 to 2000. A loan is dened as a
single loan relationship between a bank and a rm. If a rm has several loans products with the same
bank (e.g. overdraft, working capital loan), all loan products are aggregated to a single loan. There is
practically no missing data because nancial institutions are legally required to report monthly data on
all loans above a threshold of US$ 5,000.14 The data includes variables on tax identication number,
lending bank, loan amount, collateral, borrowing currency, loan type, and default status. One small
commercial bank (Banco Solventa) is missing from the dataset. This should not be a concern because
the bank only operated for two years and had a market share of less than two percent.15 In total, the
data contains loan-level information from 25 commercial banks and 21 municipal banks covering 98
percent of corporate lending.
The loan data are generally of high quality. The bank regulator invests considerable resources
to ensure complete coverage and conducts regular bank audits to verify the accuracy of the dataset.
Personal interviews with managers from several banks conrm that all banks refer to this data for
credit approvals and credit monitoring. The data is also used for credit reports sold by private credit
bureaus. An interview with the general manager of the main private credit bureau Equifax conrmed
that the data quality is comparable to the United States. In addition, I conducted several consistency
checks of the data. I found no missing data once a nancial institution entered the dataset. Also, there
is a high correlation between total credit from bank balance sheets and total credit from the registry
with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.99.
Most of the analysis restricts the dataset to rms with loan relationships with both foreign- and
domestically-owned banks. This restriction is chosen because the empirical analysis uses variation
within rms which requires loan relationships with each type of bank for empirical identication. This
gives me a sample of 20,568 loan relationships and 7,095 rms. The average number of loans per rms
14 In 1999, the bank supervisor lowered the threshold to zero. For consistency I drop all loans below US$5,000.
15Discussions with the bank regulator suggest that new banks have several months until they start reporting to the
credit registry. Bank Solventa apparently went out of business even before starting to report. The bank license was later
transformed in a license for a nance company.
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is 2.81, which reects the fact that all rms have at least two loan relationships.
Table 1 presents summary statistics at the loan-level, rm-level, and bank-level by foreign bank
ownership. Appendix II describes the construction of all variables. The summary statistics show
that foreign- and domestically-owned banks engage in similar lending activities. Both types of banks
denominate about 80 percent of loans in US dollars and have about 40 percent of lending covered by
collateral. With respect to loan types, both foreign- and domestically-owned banks provide similar
loan products. Foreign-owned banks lend 37 percent long-term, 36 percent short-term, 7 percent
as leasing and the remainder as overdraft or export nancing. Domestically-owned banks lend 36
percent long-term, 39 percent short-term, 3 percent as leasing and the remainder as overdraft or export
nancing. Overall, these summary statistics show no di¤erence in the lending mix across foreign- and
domestically-owned banks.
Some of the analysis on the impact of the credit supply shock on rms uses the full dataset. I
therefore also provide summary statistics for the full dataset in Appendix Table A1. The summary
statistics for the full dataset show little di¤erences in loan characteristics between the full dataset and
the restricted dataset.
VI Results: Impact on Lending
A E¤ect of Foreign Ownership on Bank Financing
This section examines the impact of the credit supply shock on nancing by international lenders to
foreign- and domestically-owned banks. I start by estimating regression (3). The outcome variable is
the natural logarithm of total debt nancing by international lenders.
Table 3 presents the results. Column (1) shows that nancing to domestically-owned banks de-
creases 39 percent compared to nancing to foreign-owned banks. As shown in the non-parametric
results, this nding is driven by the di¤erential response to the credit supply shock by arms-length
lenders and owner/lenders. Column (2) weights the regression by bank size. The coe¢ cient on foreign
bank ownership decreases to 30 percent but remains statistically signicant. Thus, after the credit
supply shock domestically-owned banks experience a signicant decrease in nancing as compared to
foreign-owned banks.
For robustness, I estimate similar regressions with other sources of bank nancing (e.g. deposits,
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interbank-loans, equity) as outcome variables. Deposits are the main source of nancing and the theory
developed for arms-length lenders may also apply to depositors, especially to larger and nancially
more sophisticated ones. Furthermore, depositors may also switch banks, or leave the banking system
altogether, if they expect international lenders to reduce nancing to domestically-owned banks.
Column (3) and Column (4) report the results. Column (3) shows a positive but not statistically
signicant e¤ect of foreign bank ownership on deposits of 6.9 percent. Column (4) shows that the
coe¢ cient decreases to 4.1 percent after weighting the regressions by bank size. These results are
suggestive that some depositors switch from domestically- to foreign-owned banks, but the e¤ect is
quantitatively small. Using the coe¢ cients from the weighted regressions, I estimate that the shift
of deposits from domestically- to foreign-owned banks accounts for 17 percent of the total change in
nancing of domestically- and foreign-owned banks. I therefore attribute the change in nancing to
banks in Peru primarily to international lenders. I also examine the impact of the credit supply shock
on other sources of bank nancing such as interbank loans and equity and nd no statistically or
economically signicant e¤ect.
I then estimate the impact of the credit supply shock separately for arms-length lenders and
owner/lenders. I nd that arms-length lenders (e.g. UBS ) reduce nancing to both foreign- (e.g. Citi-
Peru) and domestically-owned banks (e.g. Banco Wiese) equally by about 40 percent. In contrast,
owner/lenders (e.g. Citibank) increase nancing to their subsidiaries (e.g. Citi-Peru) by 30 percent
but decrease bank nancing to non-subsidiaries (e.g. Banco Wiese) by 43 percent. These results are
not statistically signicant due to the small sample size of owner/lenders. However, the ndings are
suggestive that nancing after the credit supply shock is indeed driven by an increase in nancing of
owner/lenders to their subsidiaries and by a decrease in nancing of arms-length lenders to all banks.
B Testing for Credit Supply versus Credit Demand
This section implements the empirical estimator developed in the identication strategy. I separately
estimate the impact on loan size (intensive margin) and whether a loan relationship enters or exists
during the analysis period (extensive margin). I estimate the intensive and extensive margin separately
because loan size is censored at zero, which may bias the OLS estimator. Also, separate estimation of
the intensive and extensive margin allows me to identify the relative importance of each margin.
The unit of observation is a loan relationship (or loan) at a given point in time. A loan relationship
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is dened as single rm-bank pair. I restrict the analysis to rms that have both loans with foreign-
and domestically-owned banks at the beginning of the dataset. The restriction is chosen because the
preferred estimator with rm xed-e¤ects only identies o¤ those rms and the restriction therefore
ensures comparability across specications. The restricted dataset yields a sample of 7,095 rms and
26,784 loan relationships.16
To facilitate computation, I collapse and time-average the data one year before and one year after
the Russian default. The collapsing smooths out variation and generates conservative standard errors.
I choose the period one year around the Russian default because one year after the Russian default
the Peruvian government initiates a program to purchase non-performing loans from banks in nancial
di¢ culties. The program is primarily targeted at domestically-owned banks and therefore improves
their credit supply. To the extent that the program is anticipated, it should bias the estimation against
nding an e¤ect of the credit supply shock since the program o¤sets some of the reduction of nancing
to domestically-owned banks.
To compute the intensive margin, I only include observations with positive loan amounts to avoid
bias coming from large drops in loan size as rms enter or exit loan relationships. Therefore the
number of observations for estimating the intensive margin is smaller than the number of observations
for estimating the extensive margin. For the extensive margin, I use a dummy set to one if a loan
relationship has a positive loan amount and zero otherwise. I weight the regression using rm size one
year before the Russian default. The weighting is chosen to reect the larger economic importance of
big rms and ensures that the results are not driven by a large number of small rms. I also estimate
regressions without weights and nd similar results. With respect to standard errors, I cluster all
standard errors at the bank level to allow for correlation of error terms across loans within banks. I
choose this level of clustering because the coe¢ cient on foreign ownership only varies at the bank level.
Following the identication strategy, I estimate the regression
Yijb = 0 + j + bFb + "ijb (9)
where Yijb denotes the change in the outcome of interest of loan i of rm j with bank b, such as
16The number of loan relationships is larger than the number of loan relationships in the summary statistics because
the summary statistics are restricted to loan relationships active in October 1997, while the estimation also includes loan
relationships started after October 1997.
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the natural logarithm of loan size. The regression controls for rm xed-e¤ects j and the coe¢ cient
of interest is the coe¢ cient on foreign bank ownership b:
In some regressions I add controls for loan or rm characteristics. The controls for loan character-
istics are a dummy whether the loan is denominated in foreign currency, the share of lending covered
by collateral, and the share of long-term lending, short-term lending and leasing. The controls for rm
characteristics are dummies for rm age, location dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for rm
size deciles. I include these controls to test whether the results are driven by variation in loan or rm
characteristics across foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Table 4 presents the results. Column (1) reports the preferred specication with rm xed-e¤ects.
I nd that loans relationships with foreign-owned banks increase 15.6 percent compared to loan re-
lationships with domestically-owned banks. Since the estimation controls for rm xed-e¤ects, this
result is identied o¤ variation within rms. This means that after controlling for credit demand,
there is an economically and statistically signicant di¤erence between loan relationships of foreign-
and domestically-owned banks. The result suggests that banks cannot o¤set the credit supply shock
and the shock therefore a¤ects bank lending.
Column (2) controls for loan relationship characteristics such as foreign currency, collateral and
loan type. I include these variables to test whether the results are driven by variation in loan charac-
teristics across banks. The coe¢ cient on the dummy where the loan is denominated in foreign currency
is negative. This may reect the fact that dollar-denominated loans are less attractive after the credit
supply shock because the exchange rate depreciated. The coe¢ cient on the share covered by collateral
is positive, which may reect the fact that higher collateralized loans are more likely to be continued
after the Russian default. However, neither of the two coe¢ cients is statistically signicant. Impor-
tantly, the coe¢ cient on foreign bank ownership decreases only slightly to 13.6 percent and remains
statistically signicant. This nding shows that the result in Column (1) is not driven by variation in
loan characteristics across foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
For comparison, I also estimate regression (9) without controlling for rm xed-e¤ects. Column
(3) presents the result corresponding to Column (1). I nd that loans relationships with foreign-owned
banks increase 16.2 percent compared to loan relationships with domestically-owned banks. This
coe¢ cient is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from the coe¢ cient with rm-xed e¤ects. This
result suggests that the di¤erence between foreign- and domestically-owned banks after the Russian
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default can be fully explained by the credit supply shock.
Column (4) controls for rm characteristics such as rm age, rm size, location and industry. The
controls increase the statistical t of the regression but there is little e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of interest.
Even after controlling for rm characteristics, loans relationships with foreign-owned banks increase
15.1 percent compared to loan relationships with domestically-owned banks. This nding suggests that
the results are not driven by rm heterogeneity across foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Column (5) further adds controls for loan characteristics. Similarly to the xed-e¤ects estimation in
Column (2), these controls slightly decrease the coe¢ cient on foreign bank ownership to 13.5 percent,
but the result remains statistically signicant. This nding suggests that the observed di¤erences
are not driven by variation in the loan types across banks, similarly to the results found with the
xed-e¤ects regression.
Table 5 presents the regression results for the extensive margin (exit and entry of loan relation-
ships). In these regressions I drop the specications with controls for loan characteristics because these
variables are not dened for new loan relationships.17 Column (1) reports the preferred specication
with rm xed-e¤ects. I nd that rms are 7.8 percent more likely to enter, or less likely to exit,
a loan relationship with a foreign-owned bank versus a domestically-owned bank after the Russian
default. This result provides further evidence that the credit supply shock reduces bank lending of
domestically- versus foreign-owned banks.
Column (2) and Column (3) report the corresponding specications to Columns (3) and Column (4)
in the previous table. Without controlling for rm xed-e¤ects, Column (2) shows that the coe¢ cient
of interest remains practically unchanged with 7.9 percent. Similarly to the result on the intensive
margin, this nding suggests that the di¤erence between foreign- and domestically-owned banks after
the Russian default can be fully explained by the credit supply shock. Column (3) presents the results
after adding controls for rm characteristics. Adding those controls increases the statistical t but has
little e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of interest. This nding suggests that the results are not driven by rm
heterogeneity across foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
In short, the estimation on both the intensive and extensive margin shows that domestically-owned
banks reduce lending compared to foreign-owned banks. The results are practically unchanged after
17To avoid endogeneity, I only control for loan characteristics prior to the Russian default. That is the reason why
these variables are not dened for loan relationships that start after the Russian default.
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adding loan or rm controls and estimating the coe¢ cient of interest with and without rm xed-
e¤ects. These ndings provide strong evidence that banks cannot o¤set the credit supply shock and
the shock therefore a¤ects bank lending.
C Robustness
This section discusses the validity of the identication assumption and explores the robustness to al-
ternative specications. First, the non-parametric results show that there is a slight pre-trend between
foreign- and domestically-owned rms. To explore this issue in more detail, I estimate a placebo re-
gression using data from two years before the Russian default until right before the Russian default.
I assume that the placebo cut-o¤ date is one year before the Russian default. I estimate regression
(9) and construct the dataset in the same way as described previously. In the absence of pre-trends, I
should not nd di¤erential e¤ects across foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Table A1 reports the results for the placebo regression. Column (1) shows that there is no economi-
cally or statistically signicant di¤erence across foreign- and domestically-owned banks. The coe¢ cient
on foreign bank ownership is 1.7 percent. The 95th percent condence interval rules out a coe¢ cient of
more than 5.6 percent. Column (2) adds loan controls and the coe¢ cient slightly increases to 2.0 per-
cent but remains statistically insignicant. Column (3) to Column (5) estimate the regression without
rm-xed e¤ects. Similarly to the results in the previous section, the coe¢ cient on foreign bank own-
ership remains practically unchanged. I also conduct placebo regressions using di¤erent time-periods
and cut-o¤ dates and nd similar results. These ndings suggest that the results are not driven by
pre-trends.
However, since the non-parametric results indicate a slight pre-trend, I also examine the full dataset.
I nd that the pre-trend at the aggregate level is driven by rms that initially borrow from domestically-
owned banks and then start a loan relationship with a foreign-owned bank. Since the restricted dataset
only includes rms that have loan relationships with both types of banks at the beginning of the
dataset, the rms driving the pre-trend are not included in the main regressions. Importantly, those
rms represent less than 24 percent of lending and the pre-trend accounts for only 18 percent of the
aggregate di¤erence in bank lending between foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Second, regression (9) uses foreign ownership as a proxy for the impact of the credit supply shock.
To ensure that the results are indeed driven by changes in nancing by international lenders, I estimate
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regression equation (9) using directly the variation in nancing by international lenders. The advantage
of this strategy is that I can exploit variation within domestically- and foreign-owned banks instead
of the more coarse measure of foreign ownership. However, the disadvantage is that nancing by
international lenders may vary for reasons other than the credit supply shock.
Table A2 reports the results. Column (1) shows that an increase in nancing by international
lenders by one percent increases average loan size by 0.38 percent. As shown in Table 3, the average
di¤erence between foreign- and domestically-owned banks is 30 percent. This implies that the di¤eren-
tial change in foreign debt across foreign- and domestically-owned banks explains a change in loan size
of 11.2 percent. This coe¢ cient is similar to the one estimated using foreign bank ownership. Columns
(2) to Columns (5) explore the robustness to controlling for loan and rm characteristics. Similarly to
the regressions in the previous section, the results are robust to the di¤erent specications.
Third, the regression uses the restricted dataset with rms that have loans from both foreign- and
domestically-owned banks at the beginning of the dataset. Some of the results may therefore come
from a relative shift of domestically-owned banks from borrowers that also borrow from foreign-owned
banks to borrowers that borrow exclusively from domestically-owned banks. This nding would not
invalidate the main results but it would alter the interpretation of the impact of the credit supply
shock. I therefore estimate regression equation (9) for the entire sample.
Table A3 reports the results. Column (1) shows that the results with the full dataset are similar to
the results with the restricted dataset. I nd that loan relationships with foreign-owned banks increase
15.2 percent compared to loan relationships with domestically-owned banks. Column (2) reports the
results after controlling for loan characteristics. Similarly to the main regressions, the coe¢ cient on
foreign ownership slightly decreases to 13.3 percent. Column (3) to Column (5) report the results on
foreign ownership without controlling for rm-xed e¤ects. Again the coe¢ cients remain practically
unchanged. However, these coe¢ cients need to be corrected for the pre-trend discussed above. After
the correction, the coe¢ cients on foreign ownerships are slightly smaller than the ones estimated in
the main regressions but not statistically signicantly di¤erent. I thus nd a similar e¤ect of the credit
supply shock with the full dataset as with the restricted dataset.
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VII Results: Impact on Firms
A Impact on Firm Borrowing
The previous section nds a di¤erential credit supply shock to foreign-owned and domestically-owned
banks. The di¤erential credit supply shock a¤ects rm borrowing, if rms cannot o¤set the credit
supply shock by switching across banks or borrowing from other nancial intermediaries. This might
be the case if information asymmetries in credit markets prevent rms from starting loan relationships
with new banks. To test whether rms can o¤set the shock, I compare outcomes of rms banking with
foreign-owned banks before the Russian default with outcomes of rms banking with domestically-
owned banks before the Russian default.
The unit of observation is a rm at a given point in time. To ensure comparability to the previous
section, I estimate the impact using both the restricted and the full dataset. The restricted dataset
contains 7,095 rms with a total of 26,784 loan relationships. The full dataset contains 38,691 rms
with a total of 58,653 loan relationships.
To facilitate computation, I again collapse and time-average the data one year before and one year
after the Russian default. I again weight the regression using rm size before the Russian default. I
cluster standard errors at the bank level to allow for correlation in error terms within banks. Since
rms can borrow from several banks, I cluster for each rm on the bank with the largest share of
lending.
I construct a new variable to capture whether a rm had established bank relationships with
foreign- or domestically-owned banks before the credit supply shock. For each rm j; I compute the
loan-weighted share Fj of borrowing with foreign-owned banks one year prior to the Russian default.
For example, if a rm only banks with foreign-owned banks prior to the Russian default, this variable
is one. If a rm only banks with domestically-owned banks prior to the Russian default, this variable
is zero.
Following the identication strategy I estimate the regression
Yj = 0 + 1Fj + "j : (10)
where Yj denotes the outcome of interest such as the log change in total borrowing of rm j.
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The regression is similar to the loan-level regression from the previous section. The main di¤erence
is that the regression does not control for rm xed-e¤ects because those would be collinear with
the foreign-bank share Fj . For some regression, I add controls for rm observables such as rm age,
location, industry, and rm size.
Table 4 presents the results for both the restricted and the full dataset. Using the restricted dataset,
Column (1) shows that a one standard deviation increase in the foreign-bank share Fj increases total
borrowing by 7.1 percent. Column (2) controls for rm-level observables. The controls slightly increase
the coe¢ cient on foreign-bank share Fj to 9.3 percent but the di¤erence between the two coe¢ cients
is not statistically signicant. These results suggest that exposure to foreign-owned banks prior to the
Russian default raises access to credit after the credit supply shock.
The result is identied o¤ variation in the exposure to foreign- versus domestically-owned banks.
Importantly, the loan-level results from the previous section suggest that the variation is not confounded
by changes in rm investment opportunities and rather represents the impact of the credit supply shock.
Moreover, the robustness to rm controls suggests that the di¤erence is not driven by variation in the
type of rms borrowing from foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
Column (3) and Column (4) estimate the corresponding regression for the extensive margin. The
outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a positive amount outstanding and zero otherwise.
Column (3) shows that a one standard deviation increase in the foreign-bank share Fj decreases the
likelihood of having a positive amount outstanding by 0.8 percentage points. After controlling for rm
observables, Column (4) shows that the coe¢ cient remains practically unchanged at 0.7 percentage
points. These results are not statistically signicant. The main e¤ect of the credit supply shock is thus
on the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin. This is not surprising because the restricted
dataset only contains large rms, which are less likely than smaller rms to completely stop borrowing
after the credit supply shock.
Column (5) to Column (8) estimate the corresponding regressions for the full dataset. The main
di¤erence between the restricted and the full dataset is that the full dataset adds rms that have
loans with only foreign- or domestically-owned banks. Column (5) and Column (6) report results
for the intensive margin. After controlling for rm observables, a one standard deviation increase
in the foreign-bank share Fj increases total borrowing by 4.2 percent. Column (7) and Column (8)
report results for the extensive margin. After controlling for rm observables, a one standard deviation
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increase in the foreign-bank share Fj increases the likelihood of having a positive amount outstanding
by 2.1 percentage points.
Compared to the restricted dataset, the full dataset shows a smaller e¤ect on the intensive margin
and a larger e¤ect on the extensive margin. This result probably reects the fact that the full dataset
includes smaller rms that are more likely than large rms to be completely cut o¤ from borrowing
after the credit supply shock. Overall, the results suggests that the credit supply shock lowers access to
credit for rms borrowing from domestically-owned banks compared to rms borrowing from foreign-
owned banks.
B Impact on Loan Default and Firm Survival
This section estimates the impact on real rm outcomes. The credit supply shock a¤ects real rm
outcomes, if rms cannot o¤set the shock to bank lending by borrowing elsewhere. I measure the real
impact using two outcome variables: loan default and rm survival. Loan default is measured using
loan performance from the loan-level dataset and rm survival is measured using a separate dataset
from o¢ cial tax records. These variables measure the impact on rms that default on their loans or
close down their business due to the credit supply shock. However, these outcomes variables do not
capture the real e¤ect on rms that avoid loan default or business closure by cutting back investment
or other business expenses. I therefore interpret these measures of loan default and rm survival as
a lower bound of the real e¤ects of the credit supply shock because they do not measure the entire
impact of the credit supply shock.
I estimate regression (10) using both the full and the restricted dataset. The rst set of regressions
uses the change in loan default as outcome variable. Loan default is measured as a dummy variable
equal to one if a loan is in default and zero otherwise. Loans are dened as in default if a borrower
is delinquent for more than 60 days. The second set of regressions uses as outcome variables whether
a rm was in operation after the Russian default. This variable is measured from o¢ cial tax records
and indicates whether a rm was active as of June 2005.
Table 7 reports the results. Column (1) and Column (2) estimate the impact on loan default for
the restricted dataset. After controlling for rm observables, a one standard deviation increase in the
foreign-bank share Fj decreases the probability of loan default by 2.5 percentage points. Column (3)
and Column (4) estimate the impact of the credit supply shock on rm survival. After controlling for
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rm observables, a one standard deviation increase in the foreign-bank share Fj increases the likelihood
of rm survival by 2.3 percentage points. These ndings suggest that rms cannot o¤set the credit
supply shock by borrowing elsewhere and as a result some rms close down their business.
Columns (5) to Columns (8) report the corresponding results for full dataset. After controlling for
rm observables, a one standard deviation increase in the foreign-bank share Fj decreases the likelihood
of loan default by 2.7 percentage points and increases the likelihood of rm survival by 2.9 percentage
points. Again, these results suggest that rms cannot o¤set the credit supply shock.
The results show that the impact of the credit supply shock is larger for smaller rms. This result
is not surprising since it may be more di¢ cult for small rms than for large rms to switch to other
banks after the credit supply shock. Interestingly, the di¤erence between small and large rms is small,
which suggests that even large rms cannot o¤set the impact of the credit supply shock.
VIII Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether nancial institutions transmit nancial shocks across markets and whether
such shocks a¤ect real economic activity. I exploit the 1998 Russian default as an exogenous credit
supply shock to international lenders and trace out the impact on bank lending in Peru. I nd
three main results. First, international lenders without equity holdings in banks in Peru are more
likely to transmit a credit supply shock than international lenders with equity holdings. Second, as
a result banks without international lenders as equity holders decrease lending compared to banks
with international lenders as equity holders. Third, rms borrowing from banks without international
equity holders have worse access to bank lending after the credit supply shock than rms borrowing
from banks with equity holders, which a¤ects real rm outcomes such as rm survival. These ndings
suggest that nancial institutions transmit nancial shocks across markets and that the shocks a¤ect
real economic activity.
A natural question that arises from these ndings is whether this mechanism is relevant to other
emerging markets. Financing by international lenders is generally an important source of capital
for emerging market banks, which suggests that a credit supply shock to international lenders may
have a similar impact elsewhere. Importantly, the analysis suggests that restrictions on foreign bank
ownership imposed by bank regulators to limit exposure to nancial shocks may be the wrong policy.
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Instead, policies should assess the potential exposure to nancial shocks by analyzing the share of
lending provided by international lenders with equity holdings versus international lenders without
equity holdings.
Another natural question that arises from these ndings is whether foreign ownership of emerging
market banks is more e¢ cient than domestic ownership. It is di¢ cult to judge from the results in this
paper whether domestically-owned banks are ine¢ cient because the analysis is conditional on a credit
supply shock. If domestically-owned banks have other benets during times without a credit supply
shock, then the observed ownership structure with both foreign- and domestically-owned banks may
be an e¢ cient equilibrium outcome. However, the large increase in cross-border nancial ows and the
simultaneous increase in market shares of foreign-owned banks over the last two decades is consistent
with a comparative advantage of foreign-owned banks compared to domestically-owned banks.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Foreign Bank Ownership
Panel A: Loan-level Variables
Bank Ownership Foreign (>=0.5) Domestic (<0.5)
Loan Size (Mean) 209,097 (1,234,212) 361,774 (1,608,715)
Loan Size (Median) 33,769 49,655
% Foreign Currency 0.82 (0.33) 0.81 (0.33)
% Collateral 0.41 (0.47) 0.40 (0.45)
% Long-term Loan 0.37 (0.44) 0.36 (0.42)
% Short-term Loan 0.36 (0.42) 0.39 (0.42)
% Leasing 0.07 (0.24) 0.03 (0.16)
% Other Credit 0.20 (0.33) 0.22 (0.33)
N 10,521 10,047
Panel B: Firm-Level Variables
Bank Ownership Foreign (>=0.5) Domestic (<0.5)
Loan Size (Mean) 461,021 (2,177,222) 940,668 (4,606,825)
Loan Size (Median) 88,334 111,499
Loan Relationships 2.63 (1.18) 2.98 (1.63)
Firm Age 9.47 (8.80) 11.16 (9.97)
Located in Lima 0.65 (0.48) 0.66 (0.47)
N 1,750 5,345
Panel C: Bank-Level Variables
Bank Ownership Foreign (>=0.5) Domestic (<0.5)
Total Assets (mil, Mean) 543 (747) 427 (1,180)
Total Assets (mil, Median) 298 112
Share Deposit 0.62 (0.17) 0.62 (0.10)
Share Foreign Debt 0.18 (0.12) 0.14 (0.08)
Share Credit 0.63 (0.04) 0.60 (0.06)
Return on Assets 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Return on Equity 0.13 (0.08) 0.14 (0.08)
Interest Rate 0.16 (0.02) 0.16 (0.08)
N 12 34
This table provides summary statistics at loan-level, rm-level and bank-level by foreign bank ownership. A bank is
classied as foreign, if one of the bank owners is based outside Peru and holds at least 50 percent of control rights. A
loan is classied as foreign if the bank providing the loan is classied as foreign. A rm is classied as foreign if at least
50 percent of borrowing are with banks classied as foreign. The loan and rm-level data is restricted to rms that have
at loan relationships in good standing with both foreign- and domestically-owned banks at the beginning of the analysis
period (October 1997). The bank-level data is for all banks operating at the beginning of the dataset. All values are in
US dollars at the beginning of the analysis period (October 1997). A loan (or loan relationship) is dened as a single
bank-rm pair. If a rm has several loan products with the same bank, loan products are aggregated to a single loan.
% Long-Term Loan, % Short-term Loan, % Leasingand % Other Creditdenote the respective shares of loan types.
Foreign Currency denotes the share of lending denominated in US dollars. Collateral denotes the share of lending
covered by collateral calculated by dividing collateral value through total amount outstanding. Loan Relationships
denotes the number of loan relationships. Firm Agedenotes time since incorporation. Located in Limais a dummy
set to one if the rm headquarters are in Lima. The bank-level variables are based on bank balance-sheets at the end of
the last scal year before the Russian default (December 1997).
Table 3: E¤ect of Foreign Bank Ownership on Bank Financing
Dependent Variable Foreign Debt Deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After*Foreign Ownership 0.394 0.297 0.069 0.041
[0.142] [0.134] [0.083] [0.061]
After -0.321 -0.302 0.034 -0.032
[0.098] [0.071] [0.048] [0.032]
Bank Fixed E¤ects Y Y Y Y
Weighted N Y N Y
Banks 46 46 46 46
N 1,058 1,058 11,058 1,058
R-squared 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.99
These regressions examine the e¤ect of foreign bank ownership on nancing by international lenders before and after the
Russian default. The dataset includes all banks operating as of October 1997. The unit of observation is bank-time.
Columns (1) and (3) are unweighted and Columns (2) and (4) are weighted using bank assets in October 1997. In Columns
(1) to (2) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total foreign debt. In Columns (3) to (4) the dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of total deposits. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the bank level (46 banks).
Table 4: E¤ect of Foreign Bank Ownership on Bank Lending, Intensive Margin
Dependent Variable Change in Lending
FE FE OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Ownership 0.156 0.134 0.162 0.151 0.135
[0.075] [0.071] [0.064] [0.066] [0.068]
Foreign Currency -0.142 -0.134
[0.141] [0.082]
Collateral 0.004 0.052
[0.082] [0.054]
Firm Fixed E¤ects Y Y N N N
Firm Controls N N N Y Y
Loan Controls N Y N N Y
Firms 5,895 5,895 5,895 5,895 5,895
Loan Relationships 12,408 12,408 12,408 12,408 12,408
R-squared 0.35 0.35 >0.01 0.18 0.18
These regressions examine the e¤ect of foreign bank ownership on bank lending before and after the Russian default. The
data is restricted to (i) loans in good standing at the beginning of the dataset and (ii) rms with at least one loan each
with a foreign-owned bank and domestically-owned bank at the beginning of the dataset (63% of volume of lending).
The unit of observation is loan relationship-time and a loan relationship is dened as a single bank-borrower pair. The
regressions are weighted using rm size prior to the Russian default. The dependent variable is the change in the natural
logarithm of total lending per loan relationship. All monthly data is collapsed and time-averaged one year before and one
year after the Russian default. Zero values are dropped from the time-averaging because the extensive margin is analyzed
separately in Table 5. Column (1) and Column (2) include rm xed-e¤ects. Column (2) and (5) include loan controls.
Column (4) and Column (5) includes rm controls. Loan controls include (i) borrowing currency, (ii) share of loan type
and (iii) share covered by collateral before the Russian default. Firm-controls include 253 industry dummies, 25 state
dummies, 40 rm-age dummies and 10 rm size deciles dummies. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the bank
level (46 banks).
Table 5: E¤ect of Foreign Bank Ownership on Bank Lending, Extensive Margin
Dependent Variable Entry and Exit
FE OLS OLS
(1) (3) (4)
Foreig Ownership 0.078 0.079 0.079
[0.032] [0.037] [0.034]
Firm Fixed E¤ects Y N N
Firm Controls N N Y
Firms 7,095 7,095 7,095
Loan Relationships 26,784 26,784 26,784
R-squared 0.26 0.01 0.08
These regressions examine the e¤ect of foreign ownership on exit and entry of loan relationships before and after Russian
default. A loan relationship is dened as a single bank-borrower pair. The data is restricted to loan relationship of rms
with at least two loan relationships in good standing at the beginning of the dataset (63% of lending). The regressions
are weighted using rm size prior to the Russian default. The dependent variable is a dummy variable whether there
is positive amount outstanding (=1) or there is no amount outstanding (=0). All monthly data is collapsed and time-
averaged one year before and one year after the Russian default. Column (1) includes rm-xed e¤ects. Column (3)
includes rm controls. The regressions do not include loan controls because loan controls are not available for loan
relationships that enter the dataset during the analysis period. Firm-controls include 253 industry dummies, 25 state
dummies, 40 rm-age dummies and 10 rm size deciles dummies. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the bank
level (46 banks).
T
ab
le
6:
E
¤
ec
t
of
F
or
ei
gn
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
S
h
ar
e
on
F
ir
m
B
or
ro
w
in
g
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
Sa
m
pl
e
Fu
ll
Sa
m
pl
e
C
ha
ng
e
in
L
en
di
ng
E
xi
t
C
ha
ng
e
in
L
en
di
ng
E
xi
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Fo
re
ig
n
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
Sh
ar
e
0.
21
4
0.
16
1
0.
00
8
0.
00
7
0.
08
9
0.
14
6
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
46
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
89
]
F
ir
m
C
on
tr
ol
s
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
6,
12
0
6,
12
0
7,
09
5
7,
09
5
27
,3
49
27
,3
49
38
,6
91
38
,6
91
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
01
0.
09
>
0.
01
0.
10
>
0.
01
0.
15
0.
01
0.
11
T
he
se
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ex
am
in
e
th
e
e¤
ec
t
of
fo
re
ig
n
ba
nk
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
on
r
m
b
or
ro
w
in
g
b
ef
or
e
an
d
af
te
r
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
C
ol
um
n
(1
)
to
C
ol
um
n
(4
)
re
st
ri
ct
th
e
da
ta
se
t
to
r
m
s
w
it
h
lo
an
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
w
it
h
b
ot
h
fo
re
ig
n-
an
d
do
m
es
ti
ca
lly
-o
w
ne
d
ba
nk
s.
C
ol
um
n
(5
)
to
C
ol
um
n
(8
)
in
cl
ud
es
al
l
r
m
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
at
th
e
r
m
le
ve
l.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
us
in
g
r
m
si
ze
pr
io
r
to
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
T
he
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
in
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
to
(2
)
an
d
C
ol
um
ns
(5
)
to
(6
)
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
to
ta
l
le
nd
in
g
p
er
lo
an
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
.
In
C
ol
um
ns
(3
)
to
(4
)
an
d
C
ol
um
ns
(7
)
to
(8
)
th
e
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
w
he
th
er
a
r
m
ha
s
an
y
b
or
ro
w
in
g
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
(=
1)
or
no
b
or
ro
w
in
g
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
(=
0)
.
T
he
da
ta
is
co
lla
ps
ed
an
d
ti
m
e-
av
er
ag
ed
on
e
ye
ar
b
ef
or
e
an
d
on
e
ye
ar
af
te
r
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
T
he
F
or
ei
gn
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
Sh
ar
e
is
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
r
m
an
d
de
no
te
s
th
e
lo
an
-w
ei
gh
te
d
sh
ar
e
of
le
nd
in
g
w
it
h
fo
re
ig
n-
ve
rs
us
do
m
es
ti
ca
lly
-o
w
ne
d
ba
nk
s
on
e
ye
ar
b
ef
or
e
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
F
ir
m
-c
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
ud
e
25
3
in
du
st
ry
du
m
m
ie
s,
25
st
at
e
du
m
m
ie
s,
an
d
40
r
m
-a
ge
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
10
du
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
si
ze
de
ci
le
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
m
ai
n
ba
nk
le
ve
l
(4
6
ba
nk
s)
.
T
ab
le
7:
E
¤
ec
t
of
F
or
ei
gn
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
S
h
ar
e
on
L
oa
n
D
ef
au
lt
an
d
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
iv
al
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
Sa
m
pl
e
Fu
ll
Sa
m
pl
e
L
oa
n
D
ef
au
lt
F
ir
m
Su
rv
iv
al
L
oa
n
D
ef
au
lt
F
ir
m
Su
rv
iv
al
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Fo
re
ig
n
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
Sh
ar
e
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
61
0.
03
3
0.
05
7
-0
.0
73
-0
.0
67
0.
05
1
0.
07
4
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
32
]
F
ir
m
C
on
tr
ol
s
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
6,
48
0
6,
48
0
7,
06
3
7,
06
3
29
,1
60
29
,1
60
37
,0
78
37
,0
78
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
>
0.
01
0.
18
>
0.
01
0.
28
>
0.
01
0.
13
>
0.
01
0.
15
T
he
se
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ex
am
in
e
th
e
e¤
ec
t
of
fo
re
ig
n
ba
nk
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
on
r
m
b
or
ro
w
in
g
b
ef
or
e
an
d
af
te
r
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
to
(4
)
re
st
ri
ct
th
e
da
ta
se
t
to
r
m
s
w
it
h
lo
an
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
w
it
h
b
ot
h
fo
re
ig
n-
an
d
do
m
es
ti
ca
lly
-o
w
ne
d
ba
nk
s.
C
ol
um
ns
(5
)
to
(8
)
in
cl
ud
e
al
l
r
m
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
at
th
e
r
m
le
ve
l.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
us
in
g
r
m
si
ze
pr
io
r
to
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
T
he
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
in
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
to
(2
)
an
d
C
ol
um
ns
(5
)
to
(6
)
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
w
he
th
er
a
lo
an
is
in
de
fa
ul
t
(d
e
ne
d
as
b
ei
ng
de
lin
qu
en
t
fo
r
m
or
e
th
an
60
da
ys
).
In
C
ol
um
ns
(3
)
to
(4
)
an
d
C
ol
um
ns
(7
)
to
(8
)
th
e
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
a
du
m
m
y
w
he
th
er
th
e
r
m
is
st
ill
op
er
at
in
g
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
o¢
ci
al
ta
x
re
co
rd
s
in
Ju
ne
20
05
.
T
he
da
ta
in
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
to
(2
)
an
d
C
ol
um
ns
(5
)
to
(6
)
is
co
lla
ps
ed
an
d
ti
m
e-
av
er
ag
ed
on
e
ye
ar
b
ef
or
e
an
d
on
e
ye
ar
af
te
r
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
T
he
F
or
ei
gn
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
Sh
ar
e
is
co
m
pu
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
r
m
an
d
de
no
te
s
th
e
lo
an
-w
ei
gh
te
d
sh
ar
e
of
le
nd
in
g
w
it
h
fo
re
ig
n-
ve
rs
us
do
m
es
ti
ca
lly
-o
w
ne
d
ba
nk
s
on
e
ye
ar
b
ef
or
e
th
e
R
us
si
an
de
fa
ul
t.
F
ir
m
-c
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
ud
e
25
3
in
du
st
ry
du
m
m
ie
s,
25
st
at
e
du
m
m
ie
s,
an
d
40
r
m
-a
ge
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
10
du
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
si
ze
de
ci
le
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
m
ai
n
ba
nk
le
ve
l
(4
6
ba
nk
s)
.
Figure I: Share Prices of International Lenders
Figure I plots the average relative change in share prices of owner/lenders and arms-length lenders. Owner/lenders are
international lenders with equity holdings in banks in Peru. Arms-length lenders are international lenders that do not
have equity holdings in banks in Peru. The data includes all owner/lenders and the twenty largest arms-length lenders
for which share price data is available. The graphs shows that both type of lenders su¤ered a sharp decline in the share
price after the Russian default. There is no di¤erence in the impact of the Russian default on arms-length lenders versus
owner/lenders.
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Figure IIa: Financing by International Lenders (Absolute)
Figure IIa plots total nancing by arms-length lenders (international lenders without equity holdings) and owner/lenders
(international lenders without equity holdings) to banks in Peru Financing by owner/lenders is dened as bank-to-bank
loans of owner/lender to banks in which the owner/lender hold equity stakes. Arms-length nancing is dened as bank-
to-bank loans by international lenders to banks in which they have no equity stakes. The gure shows that nancing
owner/lenders increased after the Russian default, whereas lending by arm-lengths lenders decreased.
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Figure IIb: Financing by International Lenders (Relative)
Figure IIb plots the natural logarithm of the time-series from Figure IIa. To facilitate the comparison, the time-series are
normalized to zero with respect to the date of the Russian default. The y-axis therefore represents the relative change
in nancing compared to the date of the Russian default.
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Figure IIIa: Financing by Bank Ownership (Absolute)
Figure IIIa plots total nancing provided to foreign-owned banks and domestically-owned banks. Foreign-owned banks
are banks with an international lender as equity holder, whereas domestically-owned banks have no international lender
as equity holder. The gure di¤ers from Figure IIa because foreign-owned banks also take out some arms-length debt.
The gure shows that nancing to foreign-owned banks remained stable after the Russian default, while nancing to
domestically-owned banks decreased.
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Figure IIIb: Financing by Bank Ownership (Relative)
Figure IIIb plots the natural logarithm of the time-series from Figure IIIa. To facilitate the comparison, the time-series
are normalized to zero with respect to the date of the Russian default. The y-axis therefore represents the relative change
in nancing compared to the date of the Russian default.
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Figure IVa: Lending by Bank Ownership (Absolute)
Figure IVa plots total lending of foreign-owned banks and domestically-owned banks. Foreign-owned banks are banks
with an international lender as equity holder, whereas domestically-owned banks have no international lender as equity
holder. The gure di¤ers from Figure IIa because foreign-owned banks take nancing both from owner/lenders and
arms-length lenders. The gure shows that lending of foreign-owned banks remained stable after the Russian default,
while lending of domestically-owned banks decreased.
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Figure IVb: Lending by Bank Ownership (Relative)
Figure IVb plots the natural logarithm of the time-series from Figure IVa. To facilitate the comparison, the time-series
are normalized to zero with respect to the date of the Russian default. The y-axis therefore represents the relative change
in lending compared to the date of the Russian default.
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Figure Va: Borrowing by Domestic Firms (Absolute)
Figure Va plots total borrowing by the main bank of rms. For each rm I dene the main bank as the largest lender
before the Russian default. I separate the rms in two groups: rms with a foreign-owned bank as main bank and rms
with a domestically-owned banks as main bank. I aggregate total lending for each group of rms. The gure shows that
borrowing by rms banking with foreign-owned banks remains stable after the Russian default, while borrowing of rms
banking with domestically-owned banks declines..
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Figure Vb: Borrowing by Domestic Firms (Relative)
Figure Vb plots the natural logarithm of the time-series from Figure IVa. To facilitate the comparison, the time-series are
normalized to zero with respect to the date of the Russian default. The y-axis therefore represents the relative change
in borrowing compared to the date of the Russian default.
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Appendix II: Loan and Firm Variables
Loan Variables
(i) Foreign Currency: Dummy variable whether a loan is provided in US dollars (=1) or domestic
currency (=0).
(ii) Collateral; Share of lending that is covered by collateral. If the share is larger than one, I set
the variable to one.
(iii) Loan Size: Aggregate loan size in good standing for one rm-bank pair.
(iv) Default: Share of lending that is classied as in default.
(v): Share Long-Term Loan: Share of lending that is classied as long-term lending.
(vi) Share Short-Term Loan: Share of lending that is classied as short-term lending.
(vii) Share Leasing: Share of lending that is classied as leasing.
(viii) Share Other Credit: Share of lending that is not classied as long-term loan, short-term loan
or leasing (primarily export nancing and overdrafts).
Firm Variables
(i) Location: This variable denotes the state in which a rm is incorporated. The empirical analysis
uses a dummy for each state (25 states).
(ii) Firm age: This variable denotes the number of years since the year of incorporation (max: 40
years). The empirical analysis uses a dummy for rm age (40 dummies).
(iii) Industry: This variable denotes the 4-digit industry following the Peruvian industry classi-
cation system (based on to the North American SIC codes). The empirical analysis uses a dummy for
each industry (253 dummies).
(iv) Firm Size: This variable measures rm size by aggregating up total borrowing for each rm
one year prior to the Russian default. I replace all values below the 1st percentile and above the 99th
percentile with the respective cut-o¤ value to limit the impact of outliers.
(v) Firm Size Decile: The rm size deciles denote the corresponding decile of rm size. I add an
extra dummy for all rms that have no lending one year before the Russian default (11 dummies)
(vi) Firm Survival: A dummy variable whether a rm is operating in June 2005 according to o¢ cial
tax records.
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Appendix III: Robustness Tables
Table A1: Summary Statistics by Foreign Bank Ownership [Full Dataset]
Panel A: Loan-level Variables
Bank Ownership Foreign (>=0.5) Domestic (<0.5)
Loan Size (Mean) 134,080 (881,715) 173,102 (1,029,021)
Loan Size (Median) 20,968 22,329
% Foreign Currency 0.78 (0.38) 0.78 (0.37)
% Collateral 0.41 (0.47) 0.42 (0.46)
% Long-term loan 0.41 (0.45) 0.43 (0.45)
% Short-term loan 0.31 (0.41) 0.32 (0.41)
% Leasing 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.14)
% Other Credit 0.23 (0.35) 0.23 (0.35)
N 22,272 35,623
Panel B: Firm-Level Variables
Bank Ownership Foreign (>=0.5) Domestic (<0.5)
Loan Size (Mean) 124,400 (930,212) 281,621 (2,197,579)
Loan Size (Median) 18,643 25,383
Loan Relationships 1.30 (0.82) 1.57 (1.63)
Firm Age 7.66 (7.72) 8.82 (9.14)
Located in Lima 0.62 (0.48) 0.46 (0.49)
N 11,090 27,601
This table provides summary statistics at loan-level, rm-level and bank-level by foreign bank ownership. A bank is
classied as foreign, if one of the bank owners is based outside Peru and holds at least 50 percent of control rights. A
loan is classied as foreign if the bank providing the loan is classied as foreign. A rm is classied as foreign if at least
50 percent of borrowing are with banks classied as foreign. The loan and rm-level data includes all loan relationships
in good standing at the beginning of the analysis period (October 1997). The bank-level data is for all banks operating
at the beginning of the dataset. All values are in US dollars at the beginning of the analysis period (October 1997). A
loan (or loan relationship) is dened as a single bank-rm pair. If a rm has several loan products with the same bank,
loan products are aggregated to a single loan. % Long-Term Loan, % Short-term Loan, % Leasingand % Other
Creditdenote the respective shares of loan types. Foreign Currencydenotes the share of lending denominated in US
dollars. Collateral denotes the share of lending covered by collateral calculated by dividing collateral value through
total amount outstanding. Loan Relationshipsdenotes the number of loan relationships. Firm Agedenotes time since
incorporation. Located in Limais a dummy set to one if the rm headquarters are in Lima. The bank-level variables
are based on bank balance-sheets at the end of the last scal year before the Russian default (December 1997).
Table A2: Placebo Regression
Dependent Variable Change in Lending
FE FE OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Ownership 0.017 0.020 0.028 0.015 0.012
[0.039] [0.040] [0.037] [0.031] [0.030]
Foreign Currency -0.045 -0.016
[0.034] [0.032]
Collateral -0.005 0.029
[0.029] [0.022]
Firm Fixed E¤ects Y Y N N N
Firm Controls N N N Y Y
Loan Controls N Y N N Y
Firms 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,106
Loan Relationships 10,988 10,988 10,988 10,988 10,988
R-squared >0.01 0.05 0.05 0.47 0.47
These placebo regressions examine the e¤ect of foreign bank ownership on bank lending using data prior to the Russian
default. The data is restricted to (i) loans in good standing at the beginning of the dataset and (ii) rms with at least
one loan each with a foreign-owned bank and domestically-owned bank at the beginning of the dataset. The unit of
observation is loan relationship-time and a loan relationship is dened as a single bank-borrower pair. The regressions
are weighted using rm size prior to the Russian default. The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm
of total lending in good standing per loan relationship. All monthly data is collapsed and time-averaged two years to
one year before the Russian default and one year to right before the Russian default. Zero values are dropped from the
time-averaging. Column (1) and Column (2) include rm xed-e¤ects. Column (2) and (5) include loan controls. Column
(4) and Column (5) includes rm controls. Loan controls include (i) borrowing currency, (ii) share of loan type and (iii)
share covered by collateral in pre-period. Firm-controls include 253 industry dummies, 25 state dummies, 40 rm-age
dummies and 10 rm size deciles dummies. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the bank level (46 banks).
Table A3: E¤ect of Foreign Bank Debt on Bank Lending, Intensive Margin
Dependent Variable Change in Lending
FE FE OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in Foreign Debt 0.386 0.439 0.277 0.331 0.385
[0.125] [0.125] [0.087] [0.096] [0.099]
Foreign Currency -0.157 -0.144
[0.148] [0.088]
Collateral -0.002 0.052
[0.078] [0.056]
Firm Fixed E¤ects Y Y N N N
Firm Controls N N N Y Y
Loan Controls N Y N N Y
Firms 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887 5,887
Loan Relationships 12,347 12,347 12,347 12,347 12,347
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.01 0.18 0.19
These regressions examine the e¤ect of the change in foreign debt on bank lending before and after the Russian default.
The data is restricted to (i) loans in good standing at the beginning of the dataset and (ii) rms with at least one loan
each with a foreign-owned bank and domestically-owned bank at the beginning of the dataset (63% of volume of lending).
The unit of observation is loan relationship-time and a loan relationship is dened as a single bank-borrower pair. The
regressions are weighted using rm size prior to the Russian default. The dependent variable is the change in the natural
logarithm of total lending in good standing per loan relationship. All monthly data is collapsed and time-averaged one
year before and one year after the Russian default. Zero values are dropped from the time-averaging. For each bank, the
variable Change in Foreign Debtdenotes the log change in total foreign debt per bank. Column (1) and Column (2)
include rm xed-e¤ects. Column (2) and (5) include loan controls. Column (4) and Column (5) includes rm controls.
Loan controls include (i) borrowing currency, (ii) share of loan type and (iii) share covered by collateral in pre-period.
Firm-controls include 253 industry dummies, 25 state dummies, 40 rm-age dummies and 10 rm size deciles dummies.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the bank level (46 banks).
Table A4: E¤ect of Foreign Bank Ownership on Bank Lending [full dataset]
Dependent Variable Change in Lending
FE FE OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreig Bank Ownership 0.152 0.133 0.152 0.138 0.132
[0.064] [0.080] [0.056] [0.055] [0.069]
Foreign Currency -0.133 -0.107
[0.133] [0.064]
Collateral 0.013 0.060
[0.069] [0.043]
Firm Fixed E¤ects Y Y N N N
Firm Controls N N N Y Y
Loan Controls N Y N N Y
Firms 25,384 25,384 25,384 25,384 25,384
Loan Relationships 32,965 32,965 32,965 32,965 32,965
R-squared 0.40 0.41 >0.01 0.14 0.15
These regressions examine the e¤ect of foreign bank ownership on bank lending before and after the Russian default. The
data includes all loan relationships. The unit of observation is loan relationship-time and a loan relationship is dened
as a single bank-borrower pair. The regressions are weighted using rm size prior to the Russian default. The dependent
variable is the change in the natural logarithm of total lending in good standing per loan relationship. All monthly data
is collapsed and time-averaged one year before and one year after the Russian default. Zero values are dropped from the
time-averaging. Column (1) and Column (2) include rm xed-e¤ects. Column (2) and (5) include loan controls. Column
(4) and Column (5) includes rm controls. Loan controls include (i) borrowing currency, (ii) share of loan type and (iii)
share covered by collateral in pre-period. Firm-controls include 253 industry dummies, 25 state dummies, 40 rm-age
dummies and 10 rm size deciles dummies. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the bank level (46 banks).
